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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP

BEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 6

For week ending 8 February 1949

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Volume II

The International Week

The Rhodes armistice talks have entered their fifth week with little progress to show. As ECOSOC opened its eighth session, it faced its largest and most significant agenda to date. A first move of the Soviet reconstituted WFTU has been to call an All Asiatic Trade Union Conference in Peiping.

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WFTU launches drive to organize Asian labor. The decision of the World Federation of Trade Unions, now meeting without British, US or Dutch representatives, to hold an All Asiatic Labor Conference in Peiping next May reflects the mounting interest of the USSR in organizing Middle and Far Eastern labor into a cohesive force supporting Soviet foreign policy aims. Reported adoption of a \$1,500,000 budget to finance travel and propaganda expenses incidental to the Conference highlights the importance attached to it by the WFTU Communist leadership. The timing of the Conference may be an attempt to counteract the announced intention of the Government-sponsored India National Trade Union Congress to convene a May session of Asian labor in order to organize a non-Communist labor federation (the WFTU is reportedly anxious to "unify" India's labor organizations, now divided between the pro-Government unions and the Communists). To prepare for the Peiping Conference, apparently to be under the direction of the Soviet WFTU Assistant Secretary General, a WFTU delegation will shortly proceed to India, Burma, Pakistan and possibly other Asian countries. A simultaneous decision to effect early affiliation of Japanese trade unions suggests the wide scope of projected WFTU activity in this area. The Federation's organizing efforts in the Orient will be paralleled by those of the Communist-controlled World Federation of Democratic Youth and International Students Union. These two organizations have increased their membership in Southeast Asia to seven millions through personal contact, relief activity and the publicizing of colonial and dependent area problems, and are likely to make additional gains at the forthcoming Asian Youth Conference in Calcutta.

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Prospects for current FCOSOC session. The proposed establishment of an Economic Commission for the Middle East (ECME) and the discussion of President Truman's inaugural offer of American scientific and technical aid to under-developed areas will bring two important problems before the current session of the UN Economic and Social Council. A central issue in the formation of ECME will be the question of participation by Israel, which strongly favors postponement of the item until the next session **in order that it may become an original Commission member. ** The relatively low position of the ECME item on the agenda will result in delay and possibly postponement, but an alternate solution may be to amend the Commission's proposed terms of reference to provide for the automatic admission of Israel and Transjordan when they become UN members. Whatever the final solution, it will undoubtedly entail a good deal of political maneuvering to overcome Arab antipathy, although it is difficult to see how Israel could be permanently excluded from a Middle Eastern regional commission.

Two agenda items on economic development and technical assistance will provide the framework for consideration of President Truman's "bold new program" of aid to under-developed countries ("Point Four" of his inaugural speech). This program, if effectively implemented through the UN is accordance with the President's avowed intentions, may prove to be one of the most important contributions to the prestige of that organization and a major long-range factor in US security.

China's seat in the UN. The progressive extension of Communist role in China combined with the steady disintegration of the Nationalist Government must in the not too distant future raise the question of Chinese representation in the UN. In view of China's status as a permanent member of the Security Council, this would be a matter of major significance. With the confusion attending the shift of the Nationalist capital from Nanking to Canton, the present Chinese delegation is already experiencing great difficulty in communicating with its Government. Dr. Tsiang, the SC representative, foresees the prospect of a Communist regime claiming to speak for China in the UN, but anticipates that the present Government will maintain its claim to be the de jure government of all China even if forced to take refuge in Formosa. If a coalition were formed, however, it would be difficult to refuse to seat its UN representative; but while two rival governments continue to divide authority, the present SC incumbents occupy a favored position under SC Rules of Procedure. Rule 17 provides that any SC representative whose credentials have been questioned may continue to sit with the same rights as other representatives until the Council has decided the matter. It would thus require seven votes to unseat him. As, however, the power of the Nationalist Government approaches the point where it becomes unable to fulfill its international obligations. the UN will find it increasingly difficult to continue the fiction that the old Government speaks for China.

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Tripolitanian attitude toward Italian trusteeship. The willingness with which the Tripolitanians would accept the return of Italian rule will depend on both the attitude which the UK takes toward facilitating the return of Italian troops and the ability of local Arab leaders to reach an understanding with the Rome Government. If the growing sentiment for Italian trusteeship, largely arising from Italy's alignment with the West, results in UN award of Tripolitania to Italy, it is unlikely that the British would carry out their previous threat to abandon the area without awaiting Italian occupation. The vacuum resulting from adherence to this policy would enable the Arabs to establish a local regime which could wage guerrilla warfare when the colony was "captured" following the landing of Italian forces. Even if the British remain until the trustee assumes control, Arab resistance would also increase should it become generally known beforehand that the UK will not use its own forces to re-establish Italian authority. On the other hand, if the British gradually turn the colony over to incoming Italian administrators, police and troops, the transition will be facilitated, although sporadic disorders may be expected in any case. Were extreme measures of repression employed against such resistance, serious repercussions could be expected throughout the Middle East.

There apparently is a divergence of opinion between the prominent Tripolitanian spokesman, Beshir Saadawi, and the local Arab leaders over whether to negotiate with Italy. Saadawi, reportedly intending to remain in the country only if his goal of independence is achieved, is continuing to hold out for this solution. The resident leaders, aware of the necessity of maintaining an escape hatch which would permit their continued unmolested existence in the colony should Italian trusteeship materialize, are more desirous of compromise through agreement with Italy. Thus motivated by self-preservation, the local leaders may overrule Saadawi and seek a modus vivendi with Rome which would limit Italian immigration and landholding and would permit Arab participation in the government. In such an event, they will reportedly counsel the people against resistance, thus lessening the probability of guerrilla warfare. The local Arab leaders would be still further encouraged to adopt a cooperative attitude by the likelihood that the General Assembly will insert in any Trust Agreement a proviso calling for independence in ten years and by the fact that Trusteeship Council supervision will safeguard the rights of the local population.

India presses for SC follow-up on Indonesia. The Indians, as the driving force behind the New Delhi Conference, are intently waiting to see whether the Dutch will comply with the SC Indonesian resolution and, if not, what the Council proposes to do. Prime Minister Nehru and Bajpai of the Foreign Office have recently emphasized the importance which they attach to the Security Council's following through in the Indonesian case. Should the Council fail to do so, the UN would lose prestige throughout Asia, and renewed agitation for independent action by the Asian Conference participants would be the probable consequence.

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